In literally 6 months (or less), we may see a "run on the bank" in the Insurance industry -- specifically a withdrawal of Variable annuity and possibly Fixed annuity assets from weaker players such as Genworth, Hartford, and Lincoln (Symbols GNW, HIG, and LNC). Once annuityholders and/or their financial advisors get the belief that their policies are in any danger of nonpayment, advisors will switch clients out of perceived weak institutions within weeks if not days. The fact that these three companies are now buying captive banks in order to qualify for TARP assistance does not solve the intermediate-to-long term problems of deteriorating investments.
Principal Financial Group $60 Billion of investable assets, $20B rated Baa or lower, $400 Million in impairments aka writedowns for the first 9 months of 2008, $86M of which was Lehman. Principal carries $4 Billion of net Unrealized losses on its fixed income assets (1.8 B on securities maturing in 12 months or less) - compare to 12/31/07, a small net unrealized gain. Potential commercial mortgages listed as a potential problem": just under 1%. Principal holds almost $10 Billion of res/commercial MBS and other ABS. What's worse - top-line revenue is stagnating in conjunction with the funding issue...what a deadly combo. Analogy: it's like an individual who has to take a huge pay cut to keep his/her job, while at the same time their credit card lines are closed off and they have a limited amount of liquid assets to tap in order to meet the monthly expenses, which are mostly of a fixed nature.
The real drivers of financial volatility in this sector are DAC writedowns, hedging losses associated with insuring benefits within VA, and profitability models that will not be realized. DAC represents the cost of the commission (approximately 7% of the total contract) that is fronted by an insurer to the salesperson/agent. Hedging losses are linked with investments designed to cover the cost of future payments (‘living benefits’) to policy holders if the equity markets fail to perform. This leaves a significant portion of an insurer’s portfolio unprotected against loss. What will be the future utilization rate of the lifetime living benefits feature? Insurers are now on the hook to pay income to their client base for an indefinite period of time -- conceivably 20-30 years if clients begin to exercise this option en masse in the near future. Does an insurance company have sufficient cash reserves to pay claims or surrenders in an environment where underlying investments have fallen apart? When you calculate the bond/real estate losses backing the FA, the VA DAC write-downs, breakage of hedging strategies, and mispricing of living benefits that are certain to have much higher utilization rates than expected, the all-in writedowns/losses easily climb into the Multi-billions.
LNC, HIG, and GNW are identified as three of the top four S&P 500 gainers since 20 Nov 2008, each with gains of 200% to 400%. See: http://bespokeinvest.typepad.com/bespoke/2009/01/crazy-gains-since-the-1120-low.html
ReplyDeleteThat's not to say that they will not crash but the last 6 weeks have run strongly against this prediction.
According to the very first sentence of my Annuities post, what was the time frame of my comment/prediction? Was it 6 weeks? Hardly. Did I explictly say anyone should Short those securities? I don't see any part of this post that can be interpreted as investment advice, and certainly not a "short these stocks now" hue and cry. The posting does not discuss stock prices per se, but rather a mass-withdrawal/forced early payout of annuity contracts by late springtime. Please re-assess your comments in May of 2009.
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